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With the benefit of hindsight, financial markets and i stitutions proved to be much more 
fragile to shocks than regulators and supervisors expected. Financial innovation was accused 
of having played a decisive role in the recent financi l turmoil. In the wake of the crisis and 
after the adoption of generous rescue packages and liqui ity facilities by several governments, 
a co-ordinated effort is being made to revise prudential standards, both at the micro- and the 
macroprudential level. In these efforts, governments appear to follow the rules promulgated 
within the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). After an examination of the 
interaction between prudential regulation and financi l innovation, the paper critically reviews 
the new prudential standards adopted within the BCBS known as ‘Basel III’, in particular 
those relating to regulatory capital and liquidity. One of the essential lessons of the crisis is 
that such requirements can no longer be limited to banks, in view of the contribution of the 
shadow banking system to the crisis. Furthermore, rel vant national initiatives in the EU and 
the US are discussed and potential conflicts with the Basel III framework are pinpointed. In 
addition, the relevance of the prudential carve-out within the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) is examined. As rule creation outside the GATS grows, rule outsourcing in 
the area of financial services becomes well-established, thereby increasingly pointing to the 
limited role of the GATS in this area.  
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A. Introductory Remarks 
The recent financial crisis has revealed significant failures in prudential regulation and 
supervision of the financial sector. Such failures have related not only to individual 
institutions but also to the financial system as a whole.1 Regulatory frameworks and the 
dominant neoliberal paradigm of financial markets which prevailed in recent decades have 
proved incapable in terms of prevention, management and resolution of the financial turmoil. 
One of the many useful lessons that the crisis has taught to regulators and governments was 
that nationally-focused regulatory models are doomed to fail in an integrated and 
interconnected global financial system, where financi l institutions and the ‘shadow banking 
system’ know no borders.2 More crucially, the crisis cast doubt on the very abilities of 
national supervisors to cooperate and coordinate. It ven led to a reassessment of or rather 
sealed the shift away from the tradition of minimum harmonization and mutual recognition 
upon which the EU financial system was built within the context of the EU single market.3 
During their first summit in Washington, the G20 lead rs committed to the implementation of 
policies in accordance with five common principles for reform of financial markets and 
regulatory regimes: strengthening transparency and ccountability; enhancing sound 
regulation; promoting integrity in financial markets; reinforcing international cooperation; 
and reforming international financial institutions. With respect to the objective of enhancing 
sound regulation, the G20 leaders pledged to strength  prudential oversight and risk 
management, while ensuring that no financial markets, products or participants remained 
unregulated or not subject to oversight. In addition, they committed to ensuring that 
regulation is efficient, does not impede financial innovation, and supports the expansion of 
trade in financial services.4 Thus, in the relevant political discourse the interrelationship 
between financial innovation, trade and prudential regulation was regarded as a delicate one. 
Financial innovation is an essential part of any activity within the financial system, as 
investors search for instruments to address market inefficiencies or imperfections. It has also 
been the driving force behind the effective diffusion of financial products and improved 
service to consumers. Financial innovation can ameliorate agency conflicts and reduce 
transaction costs.5 It has also allowed financial activities to be split up so that outsourcing 
could dominate certain areas such as clearing and settlement of payments or management of 
data.6 Financial innovation has also been an engine of ecnomic growth, notably due to its 
crucial role in financing otherwise ineligible investments or technological projects that were 
not sufficiently mature in the eyes of traditional financial institutions, as they lacked the tools 
to adequately evaluate and manage risks.7 For instance, venture capital firms and investment 
                                                
1 Financial system can be defined as the set of markets, intermediaries, and infrastructures through which 
households, corporations, and governments obtain funding for their activities and invest their savings. See P. 
Hartmann; A. Maddaloni; and S. Manganelli, ‘The Euro Area Financial System: Structure, Integration and 
Policy Initiatives’ (2003) 19 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 180. 
2 Financial Stability Board (FSB), ‘Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues’, Background Note, April 2011. 
3 Cf N. Moloney, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for the EU Financial 
Market – A Tale of Two Competences: Part (1) Rule-Making’ (2011) 12 European Business Organization Law 
Review 41, at 53. 
4 Declaration, Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington, 15 November 2008, para. 9. 
5 B. Henderson and N. Pearson, ‘The Dark Side of Financial Innovation’, 2009, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342654 
6 See UNCTAD, The Information Economy Report – Trends and Outlook in Turbulent Times, 2009. 
7 S. Michalopoulos; L. Laeven; and R. Levine, ‘Financi l Innovation and Economic Growth’, NBER Working 





banks changed the landscape of technological innovation, confirming the positive relationship 
between financial innovation, technological innovation and economic growth.8 The same goes 
for securitization (that is, the transformation of assets that are difficult to value into tradeable 
securities, for instance, mortgage-backed securities), which is considered as a positive 
financial innovation despite the recent events in the US housing market.9 
When it comes to regulating financial institutions, regulators need to ensure that their 
intervention minimizes moral hazard and the danger of systemic risk, and that it safeguards 
the safety and soundness of the system without discouraging financial innovation. Prudential 
rules relate mainly to capital and liquidity requirements.10 One of the main deficiencies of the 
system that prevailed in past decades was that it hd undermined the importance of liquidity 
regulation in favour of capital adequacy. However, ven the capital adequacy levels 
previously established were considered inadequate because they did not take procyclicality 
into account.11 In addition, various innovative financial instruments remained outside the 
purview of prudential regulation or were regulated only lightly because it was erroneously 
believed that they do not pose any systemic risk.12 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: After a review of the importance of 
prudential regulation and the interrelation between prudential regulation and financial 
innovation, Section D critically reviews the work on prudential regulation, both at the micro 
(system-based) and macro (institution-based) prudential level, notably within the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), and the initiatives for improved regulatory 
cooperation at the global level. As evidenced by the recent crisis, micro- and macro-prudential 
regulation and supervision are inextricably linked, as increased resilience at the level of 
individual banks inevitably diminishes the probability of a system-wide shock. The paper will 
further examine initiatives in the EU and the US aimed at regulating institutions and products 
which have been regarded as innovative such as derivatives or securitization. Whereas market 
discipline has failed in several respects, a thorough examination of the current pro-regulation 
stance is still needed to support the necessity of intervention and the choice of instruments.  
Section E discusses the relevance of the GATS prudential carve-out and the treatment of 
                                                
8 For instance, it was found that venture capital in the United States was responsible for some 10% of US 
industrial innovation in the period 1983–1992, even though it represented on average not more than 3% of 
corporate R&D in that period. See S. Kortum and J. Lerner, ‘Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capit l to 
Innovation‘ (2000) 31 RAND Journal of Economics 674. Also A. Alexander and P. Rosenboom, ‘Does Private 
Equity Investment Spur Innovation?’ECB Working Paper No 1063, 2009. 
9 See IMF, Global Financial Stability Report – Durable Financial Stability: Getting There from Here, April 
2011, p. 27; also K. Dam, ‘The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and Comparative 
Perspectives’ (2010) 10 Chicago Journal of International Law 1. 
10 Disclosure requirements, which also constitute part of prudential regulation, are outside the scope of this paper 
and they have been discussed elsewhere. See P. Delimatsis, ‘Financial Innovation and Transparency in Turbulent 
Times’, (2011) 33 Journal of Financial Transformation 99. Disclosure measures cannot be regarded, strictly 
speaking, as financial soundness measures, as their main objective is to prevent fraud and strengthen corporate 
governance. See R. Ahrend; J. Arnold; and F. Murtin, ‘Prudential Regulation and Competition in Financial 
Markets’, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No 735, ECO/WKP(2009)76, December 2009, p. 17. 
11 However, other voices argue that bank regulation is ‘inherently procyclical; it bites in downturns, but fails to 
restrain in booms’. See C. Goodhart, B. Hofmann; and M. Segoviano, ‘Bank Regulation and Macroeconomic 
Fluctuations’ in X. Freixas; P. Hartmann; and C. Mayer (eds), Handbook of European Financial Markets and 
Institutions (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 691, 700ff. 
12 For early voices raising their concerns, see, among thers, C. Leathers and J. Patrick Raines, ‘The 
Schumpeterian role of financial innovations in the N w Economy’s business cycle’ (2004) 28 Cambridge 





financial innovation in this multilateral regulatory framework. Section F concludes. 
B. The Role and Importance of Prudential Regulation for the Financial System 
Several factors can explain the rapid growth of the financial sector. First, technological 
progress in communications and information technology has given a fillip to the expansion of 
trade in financial services.13 The use of innovative processes and technologies in the financial 
sector has transformed its modus operandi.14 This trend continues with the ever-increasing 
use of Internet-based banking services.15 In addition, deregulatory trends have dominated the 
sector for a long time, whereas light regulation of certain niches in the sector also led to 
considerable amounts of capital being directed towards such options. Furthermore, financial 
services and the movement of capital were liberalized fast – for some countries, too fast – 
driven by well-organized efforts and arrangements within the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Notably the agreement on liberalizing 
financial services in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round heralded an era of financial 
globalization and unprecedented openness in the sector. Finally, globalization and 
competition for increasing returns and diminution of c st around the globe – eg through 
outsourcing – could only increase the level of integration, consolidation and interdependence 
of financial markets worldwide. 
Financial services, together with telecommunications a d transport, are the infrastructural 
backbones of any modern economy. They have important spillovers across all economic 
sectors and are essential inputs for economic development. All the branches of economic 
activity essentially rely on access to financing. In that sense, financial services are far more 
important than their direct share in the economy suggests. A growing body of empirical 
analyses, including firm-level studies, industry-level studies, individual country studies and 
broad cross-country comparisons, demonstrate a strong p sitive link between the expansion of 
financial services and long-term economic growth.16 The financial sector is a ‘make-or-break’ 
sector for many developing countries in determining whether they achieve real economic 
growth – especially given the challenges that both industrial and developing countries have 
faced in their efforts to build robust financial systems.17 However, such links are not absolute 
and several considerations and factors are relevant.18 For instance, it was argued that certain 
                                                
13 A. N. Berger, ‘The Economic Effects of Technological Progress: Evidence from the Banking Industry’ (2003) 
35 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 141. 
14 See WTO, Committee on Trade in Financial Services, ‘Impact of Technological Developments on Regulatory 
and Compliance Aspects of Banking and Other Financial Services under the GATS’, S/FIN/W/74, 21 Septembr 
2010. For some nuances, see H. Degryse and S. Ongena, ‘T chnology, Regulation, and the Geographical Scope 
of Banking’ in Freixas; Hartmann; and Mayer (eds), above note 11, p. 345, at 362. 
15 Cf. Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ‘The implications of electronic trading in financial markets’, 
Committee on the Global Financial System, January 2001; also BCBS, ‘Management and Supervision of Cross-
Border Electronic Banking Activities’, May 2003; and International Organization of Securities Commission  
(IOSCO), ‘Regulation of Remote Cross-Border Financil Intermediaries’, February 2004. 
16 See R. Levine, ‘Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence’ in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds), Handbook of 
Economic Growth, Vol. 1A (North Holland, 2005), p. 865. Also R. Rajan and L. Zingales, ‘Financial 
Dependence and Growth’ (1998) 88 American Economic Review 559.  
17 See also R. King and R. Levine, ‘Finance and Growth: Shumpeter Might be Right’ (1993) 153:3 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 717. 
18 See D. Rodrik and A. Subramanian, ‘Why did Financil Globalization Disappoint?’, 56(1) IMF Staff Papers 
(2009), 112; also M. Ayhan Kose; E. Prasad; K. Rogoff and S.-J. Wei, ‘Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal’, 





deregulatory practices were imposed on them without account being taken of their domestic 
market conditions. In addition, allowing establishment by foreign banks did not really benefit 
domestic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as they rather focused on serving the 
government or multinational enterprises.19 
The financial services sector is one of the most densely regulated sectors in any advanced 
economy. There are two main reasons for this.20 The first is the central economic role the 
financial system enjoys: what distinguishes the financial services sector from other service 
activities is its close links with the economy at lrge.21 Second, it is possible that problems 
arising in particular institutions or markets may, if allowed to spread, lead to a loss of the 
confidence of consumers, investors and stakeholders in that system and, therefore, prudential 
policies that pre-empt or reduce systemic risk and provide safety nets are vital for a safe and 
sound financial system that functions competitively.22 Therefore, governments interfere with 
financial markets to reduce risk and enhance financial stability.23 
The financial crisis of 2007–9 has, however, revealed inexplicably lax regulatory frameworks 
for certain non-banking institutions, failures arising from attempts of banks to get involved in 
non-traditional banking activities; and strict, but nevertheless inadequate, prudential rules. 
Politics also played a negative role in this calamitous equation.24 In the aftermath of the 
current credit crunch, the stringency of the rules may increase, but a central question remains 
as to how, at the same time, to improve the effectiv ness of such rules. The shape of the new 
rules will have significant repercussions on trade as well, as trade in financial services is 
essentially dependent on macroeconomic management, financial regulation and supervision. 
As the intrusiveness of the ‘rules of the game’ increases, trade will inevitably be affected. 
However, if such rules can ensure financial stability and resilience in the long run along with 
higher levels of global coordination, then trade will be one of the beneficiaries of such 
changes.  
Indeed, in periods of instability and distress resulting from inadequate regulation and 
supervision, trade is negatively affected, inter alia, through severe contractions in the demand 
for exports or in the availability of credit and ext rnal financing. Whereas liberalization of 
trade in financial services requires the removal of trade barriers, it gains equally from strong 
and high-quality prudential regulation and supervision, which add to the security of the 
operational environment. Additionally, forms of advnced global coordination are bound to 
                                                                                                                                              
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/rogoff/files/Financial_Globalization_A_Reappraisal_v2.pdf (visited 
10 March 2010). 
19 See ‘Report of the Commission of Experts of the Prsident of the United Nations General Assembly on 
Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System’ (the Stiglitz Report), September 2009, p. 104. 
20 Shleifer would add a third one, namely that the courts are not a suitable alternative to regulation, because facts 
are complex and fact-finding requires expertise andincentives that the judges may not have. See A. Shleifer, 
‘Efficient Regulation’, NBER Working Paper No 15651, January 2010. 
21 Indeed, what started as a financial crisis quickly became an economic crisis. Interestingly, to date only 30% of 
the discriminatory measures taken since the beginning of the crisis were in the financial sector. See . Evenett, 
Trade Tensions Mount: the 10th GTA Report (CEPR, 2011), p. 23. 
22 Cf M. Kono; P. Low; M. Luanga; A. Mattoo; M. Oshikawa; and L. Schuknecht, ‘Opening markets in financil 
services and the role of the GATS’, WTO Special Studies No.1, 1997, p. 27. 
23 Financial stability is a rather elusive concept. A financial system may be proven to be unstable only ce 
financial distress has emerged. See C. Borio and M. Drehmann, ‘Towards an Operational Framework for 
Financial Stability: “Fuzzy” Measurement and Its Consequences’, BIS Working Paper No 284, 2009. 
24 Political pressures in the mortgage markets were also one the causes of the subprime bubble. See S. 
Charnovitz, ‘Addressing Government Failure Through International Financial Law’, (2010) 13:3 Journal of 





reduce compliance costs and thus benefit further financial service suppliers. 
Prudential rules refer to the financial soundness of financial service suppliers and aim to 
prevent the risk of suppliers not being able to meet th ir liabilities as they fall due.25 From 
another perspective, prudential regulation constitutes the governance mechanism for 
representing depositor interests and protects the interests of taxpayers providing the deposit 
insurance.26 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) adopts a seemingly 
broader definition (with a pro-regulation touch) byregarding as prudential those policies or 
measures adopted to protect consumers of financial services such as investors or depositors 
and to maintain the integrity and stability of the financial system.27 Thus, prudential rules 
shall be designed to achieve a two-fold objective to protect two important groups of 
constituencies: consumers and financial institutions as a whole. Prudential rules typically 
relate to rules on capital adequacy, loan loss reserv  r quirements, minimum cash reserve and 
liquidity requirements or regulations on what constitutes an adequate level of diversification 
of risk. 
Regulating financial services for prudential purposes is an internationally accepted regulatory 
prerogative.28 Prudential rules are mainly necessary to protect consumers of financial services 
against financial institutions that are rapacious or incompetent. Rules of a prudential nature 
typically aim to remedy information inadequacies and ppear to be a prime example of a soft 
paternalistic regulatory approach on the part of the state.29 Markets are rarely able to provide 
appropriate incentives for the acquisition and dissemination of pertinent information for 
consumers relating to the qualities of financial products. Therefore, regulatory interference 
requires, inter alia, disclosure or notification ofcertain information (reporting).30 The 
imposition of minimum regulatory requirements on service suppliers reflects a certain 
uniformity of preferences (or expectations) among consumers as regards the quality and 
safety of services. For instance, the competent regulatory authorities ensure that all banks 
operating in the market meet a certain threshold of financial soundness. Prudential regulations 
can be discriminatory (typically de facto) or may be applied in a discriminatory manner. Most 
notably, however, these types of regulation can amount to unnecessary barriers to entry into 
the domestic market. 
Domestic prudential rules have been greatly influenced by the Basel process, which started in 
the 1980s within the BCBS, the most significant arm of the Bank for International Settlements 
                                                
25 P. Sharma, ‘The Integrated Prudential Sourcebook’ in M. Blair QC and G. Walker (eds), Financial Services 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 369.  
26 See M. Dewatripont and J. Tirole, The Prudential Regulation of Banks (MIT Press, 1994). 
27 See J. Marchetti, ‘The GATS Prudential Carve-Out’ in P. Delimatsis and N. Herger (eds), Financial 
Regulation at the Crossroads – Implications for Supervision, Institutional Design and Trade (Kluwer Law 
International, 2011), p. 279. 
28 Cf NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitral Tribunal Report of 17 July 2006, Fireman’s Fund v. Mexico (ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/02/01), para. 163.  
29 In general terms, the problem of asymmetric information plays a crucial role in the financial sector. First, 
owing to the existence of asymmetric information, the proximity to the consumer and a fortiori commercial 
presence becomes essential. Second, a credit institution acting as lender will probably prefer to lend to borrowers 
with whom it is familiar. See L. White, ‘Unilateral International Openness: The Experience of the U.S.Financial 
Services Sector’ in J Bhagwati (ed), Going Alone: The Case for Relaxed Reciprocity in Freeing Trade (MIT 
Press, 2002), 450ff. 
30 This should not be taken to mean that consumers ar fully protected against risk. On the contrary, individual 
financial independence has been a characteristic of our times and risk is being transferred from governments to 
households extensively. See N. Moloney, ‘Regulating the Retail Markets: Law, Policy, and the Financial Crisis’, 





(BIS). Advanced economies have typically adopted the prudential banking rules promulgated 
within the BCBS even if the objective of this forum was to set out rules applicable to 
internationally active banks. At the onset of the crisis, the implementation of Basel II was still 
under way. This said, the prudential rules of the time had reached a high degree of uniformity.  
The adequacy of both micro- and macro-prudential rules came to the forefront during the 
recent crisis. The current financial system failed in the micro-prudential supervision of 
financial service providers because it was focused on individual providers rather than the 
system as a whole. For instance, the main instrument for measuring risk, value at risk (VaR), 
can only capture the risk linked to an individual bnk in isolation and thus may be important 
for micro-prudential regulation, but does nothing to identify systemic risk.31 Thus, the 
financial system suffered from inadequate macro-prudential supervision as demonstrated by 
insufficient capacity to supervise effectively and to assess macro-systemic risks of contagion 
of correlated horizontal shocks.32 In particular, the importance of macro-prudential regulation 
for the overall stability of the financial system was largely disregarded.33  
According to Borio,34 the macro-prudential level of regulation has two traits: first, it focuses 
on the financial system as a whole, aiming at limiting the macroeconomic costs of episodes of 
financial distress. Second, it regards aggregate risk as a function of the collective behaviour of 
financial institutions and thus as a partly endogenus feature. In contrast, under a micro-
prudential approach, this would be regarded as exogenous, as individual institutions would be 
too small to affect asset prices, market conditions a d the like. Furthermore, Borio identifies 
two important dimensions relating to the macro-prudential approach: first, the cross-sectional 
dimension, which deals with the identification and management of common exposures across 
financial institutions. Under this dimension, policymakers need to create those prudential 
rules that limit the risk of losses on a big chunk of the overall financial system.35 Second, the 
time dimension, which attempts to find out how system-wide risk increases through 
interactions within the financial system and between the financial system and the real 
economy – or, as the current sovereign debt crisis reveals, macro-economic policy. 
Addressing procyclicality becomes a central objective under this dimension. 
C. The Interaction Between Prudential Regulation and Financial Innovation  
Financial innovation is a continuous, dynamic process that entails the creation and subsequent 
popularization of new financial instruments, as well as new financial technologies, institutions 
and markets.36 Financial innovation can relate to new products or services, new production 
                                                
31 Consensus about the most adequate way to measure systemic risk is yet to be built. See Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC), 2011 Annual Report, p. 132. 
32 See, generally, M. Dewatripont; X. Freixas; and R. Portes (eds), Macroeconomic Stability and Financial 
Regulation: Key Issues for the G20, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2009. 
33 See Report of the the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU chaired by Jacques de Larosiè e 
(the ‘de Larosière Report’), 25 February 2009, p. 37. See also FSA, ‘The Turner Review – A regulatory response 
to the global banking crisis’ (the ‘Turner Review’), March 2009, p. 83. 
34 C. Borio, ‘The macroprudential approach to regulation and supervision’, April 2009, available at: 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3445 (visited 15 January 2011). See also FSB; IMF; BIS, 
‘Macroprudential policy tools and frameworks – Update to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’, 
14 February 2011.  
35 M. Knaup and W. Wagner, ‘Measuring the Tail Risk of Banks’, NCCR Working Paper No 2010/14, June 
2010. 





processes and techniques, new distribution channels or new business forms.37 It is typically 
driven by investor demand for particular cash flow patterns.38 This demand allows 
intermediaries to profitably engineer the desired cash flow patterns out of other cash flows.39 
Indeed, one major trait of financial innovation is that it increases marketability, potentially 
transforming every asset of a given company into a diversification opportunity. Despite the 
current criticism about certain financial innovations, the benefits of financial innovations 
notably in their function of diversifying risk and increasing the instruments for financing are 
generally acknowledged.40 It was even argued that financial innovations contribu e to the 
reduction of macro-economic (ie real business cycle) volatility of firms, by allowing for more 
flexibility in the choice of financial structure that firms make.41 
Post-crisis, a more critical look at financial innovation is to be observed. Gennaioli et al 
linked financial innovation with financial fragility, by arguing that neglect of risks can lead to 
over-issuance of innovative securities. Investor optimism boosts the ability of intermediaries 
to innovate and sell their innovative products. The risk in this case is borne by the investors 
who are unaware of the risks (for instance, because historical analysis is favourable), whereas 
intermediaries do not have sufficient liquidity to absorb unexpectedly high supply due to a 
negative event. Once risk is revealed, investors overreact and get rid of the false substitutes 
for the traditional securities, fleeing en masse to safety.42 The authors’ main message is that 
the investors’ neglect of certain risks leads to the creation of false substitutability between 
innovative and ‘traditional’ financial products. This is due to financial innovation. The 
observed false substitutability explains not only the excessive financial innovation ex ante, 
but also the ex-post flight of investors to quality, as investors recognize the unexpected risks 
that innovative products may cause.43 
Gennaioli et al. assume that, under certain circumstances, whereas intermediaries will benefit 
from innovation, investors will lose, because they will sell their values only once the price 
drops. This result, however, is premised on the assumption that the intermediaries know about 
the risk profile of the product that they sell and thus misrepresent the innovative product to 
investors. This is reminiscent of the classical principal–agent problem and the ensuing 
information asymmetries.44  
Alternatively, both investors and intermediaries may lose out if both groups neglect the risks 
                                                                                                                                              
NBER Working Paper No 16780, February 2011, p. 6. 
37 Process innovations in particular can be deemed to come within the Schumpetarian concept of ‘destructive 
creation’. 
38 F. Allen and D. Gale, Financial Innovation and Risk Sharing (MIT Press, 1994). 
39 N. Gennaioli; A. Schleifer; and R. Vishny, ‘Neglect d Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility’, 
NBER Working Paper 16068.  
40 R. Litan, ‘In Defense of Much, But Not All, Financial Innovation’, Brookings Institution, February 2010, p. 2. 
41 U. Jermann and V. Quadrini, ‘Financial Innovations and Macroeconomic Volatility’, NBER Working Paper 
12308, June 2006. More recently, Den Haan and Sterk found that the role of financial innovation in dampening 
business cycles and thus economic downturns may have been overestimated. See W. Den Haan and  V. Sterk, 
‘The Myth of Financial Innovation and the Great Moderation’, (2011) 121(335) Economic Journal 707. 
42 In this point, the authors also allude to the problem of herding which leads to higher systemic risk. 
43 Ibid, at 26. 
44 For instance, in an attempt to restore confidence i  securitization, the new Dodd–Frank framework adopted in 
the US requires that companies selling securities such as mortgage-backed securities retain at least five per cent 
of the credit risk. This should give an incentive to intermediaries to carefully examine the safety of a given 





associated with the innovative product. In that case, the authors actually offer another 
argument to those calling for higher capital and liquidity requirements. In all cases, if 
intermediaries offer guarantees backing certain products, then the regulatory framework 
should require that the intermediaries hold sufficient capital to honour those guarantees or 
absorb sudden increases of supply. Thus, prudential regu ation can play a crucial role not only 
in harnessing the risk of financial innovative products (preventive function) but also in 
managing the risk once it becomes evident ex post (remedial function).  
Financial innovation is also linked with prudential regulation in that the former may allow for 
the circumvention of the latter. Regulatory arbitrage has been one of the reasons why financial 
innovation has been criticized so much lately. Regulatory arbitrage and short-run profits were 
regarded as one of the infamous ‘achievements’ of financial innovation, at least in the past 
decade, enhancing the welfare of few to the detriment of the many. Sometimes financial 
innovation simply escaped the purview of prudential regulation. Non-bank institutions were 
active in dangerous financial instruments, without having to comply with prudential 
requirements relating to capital adequacy or liquidity that banks abided by, thereby distorting 
competition and creating leverage in the world economy which proved to be disastrous, in 
part because of interconnectedness that the contemporary financial system displays. 
Prudential regulation can affect negatively the scope and speed of financial innovation.45 
However, effective financial intermediation did take place even during economic downturns 
and therefore an application of higher prudential st ndards across the board may have a 
relatively small impact on the functions of the financial sector, including financial innovation. 
Crucially, prudential regulation may lead to a reori ntation of financial innovation back to its 
initial, socially valuable function of managing risk and allocating capital. In the long run, 
well-designed prudential regulation and appropriate inc ntive mechanisms can delay, but will 
ultimately enhance well-thought out financial innovation. In the medium run, financial service 
suppliers will internalize the compliance costs incurred and start competing again for the 
creation of innovative products.  
Be this as it may, financial innovation has come to the forefront and has drawn the attention 
of regulators. Supervisors in developed economies in particular were criticized for their 
failure to grasp the mechanics of derivatives markets or the conduct of hedge funds.46 In the 
aftermath of the crisis, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) created a new 
Division (the first in almost 40 years!) to deal with, inter alia, financial innovation. Such a 
move is expected to improve the SEC’s expertise in the evaluation of risk and the screening of 
complex financial instruments. 
However, in a globalized market, such actions will be of limited value if they are not 
accompanied by similar actions in other countries. The need for a coordinated global action 
highlights the importance of the current work within the BCBS, notably in its new, enlarged 
form in which emerging economies also participate and share their experience and good 
practices. This is important especially because some f them were affected by the crisis only 
slightly compared to more advanced economies.47 If accompanied by a wider mandate 
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whereby non-banking institutions active in systemically important activities similar to those 
of banks are also subject to stringent rules just as b nks are, then this work at the 
supranational level may have beneficial effects on the safety of the financial system in the 
long run.48 Such inclusive regulatory approach is necessary because, as noted earlier, even if, 
individually, non-banking institutions may not be systemically important, in the aggregate the 
picture may be different and their activities can hve a significant procyclical systemic impact 
which should be tackled from a macro-prudential point f view.49 
Domestically, much can be done to create a responsive regulatory framework that punishes 
cheating and rewards well-designed financial innovati n, along with a system that allows for 
effective and expedited crisis management and resolution of failed institutions – notably those 
which are active in multiple jurisdictions. In the case of cross-border institutions, 
supranational authorities are clearly to be preferrd.50 Regulation cannot and should not be 
static, as systemic risk is a fairly elusive and volatile, dynamic concept. A responsive 
regulatory framework has dynamic aspects which necessitate close observation and regular 
reviews of regulatory choices with a view to ensuring that objectives remain valid over time 
and that the policies that were initially implemented remain necessary for achieving those 
objectives.51 Continuous review of regulatory choices and the evolution of the regulators are 
indispensable to ensure effective, well-functioning competition in liberalized services sectors 
and to pursue important legitimate public policy objectives over time, such as consumer 
protection or financial integrity.52 Such reviews are warranted for dealing appropriately with 
market distortions and failures. For instance, the dramatic effects following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers reflect the failure of the US regulatory authorities to adequately tag along 
the evolution of the major US investment banks into systemically important, albeit non-
banking, institutions and thus modify their approach towards regulating and supervising them. 
Additionally, it is important that regulators critically review and accordingly alter their 
organizational structure to better respond to the evolution of financial markets.53  
Finally, the positive relationship between market discipline and financial innovation is yet to 
be proven.54 Financial markets are evolving in such an independent and complex manner that 
heavy regulatory intervention on the side of governme ts cannot constitute an obstacle, as 
long as the higher regulatory requirements are applied to all actors in the market. Although 
the effectiveness of market discipline has been questioned from a macro-prudential 
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viewpoint,55 it appears that it is still not abandoned as a policy tool, but improvements to its 
functioning have been proposed.56 
D. Prudential Regulation Revisited in the Aftermath of the Crisis  
I. The New Basel III Framework: New Wine...in a New Bottle? 
The lack of adequate countercyclical prudential regulation was at the heart of the crisis. The 
capital adequacy rules of Basel I and II were not sufficient to capture risks stemming from 
bank exposures to transactions and instruments such as securitization or derivatives, nor did 
they take into account the systemic risk posed by the build-up of leverage in the financial 
system. In addition, the crisis revealed that regulation cannot merely focus on the legal form 
of financial firms, but rather it needs to adopt a functional approach which focuses on 
economic substance. Several non-bank institutions at the periphery of prudential regulation 
are to be blamed for the accumulation of excessive le rage. Pension funds and asset 
managers bought dubious financial products or were oth rwise exposed to vendors of such 
products. Private equity firms increased leverage in the corporate sector, whereas credit rating 
agencies (CRAs) failed to warn markets early enough about the dangers of certain financial 
instruments.57 All these events suggest that prudential regulation should no longer focus 
exclusively on banks. 
The new Basel III framework focuses on the regulation of banks in the aftermath of the crisis. 
However, the BCBS does clearly allude to the need for applying similar rules to similarly 
important or systemic institutions, be they banks or n t. Following recommendations by 
several study groups that were established to examine possible responses in the wake of the 
crisis,58 the new Basel III framework, establishes, inter alia, higher capital and liquidity 
requirements, in terms of both quantity and quality, to ensure that banks are better equipped 
to absorb losses like those relating to the global fin ncial crisis.59 The BCBS justifies the new 
standards in the following terms:60  
One of the main reasons the economic and financial cr sis, which began in 2007, 
became so severe was that the banking sectors of many countries had built up 
excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage. This was accompanied by a gradual 
erosion of the level and quality of the capital base. At the same time, many banks were 
holding insufficient liquidity buffers. The banking system therefore was not able to 
absorb the resulting systemic trading and credit losses nor could it cope with the re-
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intermediation of large off-balance sheet exposures that had built up in the shadow 
banking system. The crisis was further amplified by a procyclical deleveraging 
process and by the interconnectedness of systemic institutions through an array of 
complex transactions. During the most severe episode of the crisis, the market lost 
confidence in the solvency and liquidity of many banking institutions. The weaknesses 
in the banking sector were rapidly transmitted to the rest of the financial system and 
the real economy, resulting in a massive contraction of liquidity and credit 
availability. Ultimately the public sector had to step in with unprecedented injections 
of liquidity, capital support and guarantees, exposing taxpayers to large losses. 
Insufficient capital bases were at the source of the failure of Lehman Brothers and Bear 
Stearns and played an important role in the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America.61 Thus, 
Basel III increases the loss-absorbing capacity of banks and therefore their resilience to crises 
by introducing capital requirements which oblige banks to build up capital in good times, 
which can be used in periods of distress.62 Such capital buffers will allow procyclicality in the 
banking system to be mitigated. First, at a micro-prudential level, the Tier 1 capital 
requirement, which incorporates common equity and other financial instruments, increases 
from 4% to 6% (without taking the conservation buffer into account). The minimum total 
capital ratio will increase to 8%. The capital base of a given institution should be adequately 
disclosed and should reflect capital that is available whenever losses need to be absorbed. 
Previous techniques allowing artificial increase of capital will no longer be allowed. For 
instance, stricter rules for deductions of intangibles and minority interests from common 
equity rather than total capital may lead banks to m ve to a substantial increase of their 
capital resources.63  
Second, at a macro-prudential level, the existence of a capital conservation buffer is required. 
The capital conservation buffer restricts the payment of dividends and certain coupons and 
bonuses. It comprises common equity of 2.5% of risk weighted assets (RWAs)64 to be phased 
in between 2016 and 2019. This amounts to a total cmmon equity capital ratio of 7% and can 
be increased if national authorities consider that (aggregate) credit growth in a given period 
may be causing a build-up of system-wide risk.65 The higher level of capital is in addition to 
the stricter definition of common equity advanced by Basel III and the increase in capital 
requirements for trading activities, counterparty credit risk and other capital-market-related 
activities. Furthermore, Basel III adopts a countercyclical buffer (between 0 and 2.5 per cent) 
which comprises common equity or other capital. This buffer is regarded as an extension of 
the conservation buffer range and can be triggered when vulnerabilities are building up. The 
countercyclical buffer will alleviate the risk of less available credit due to capital 
requirements. Through this buffer, supervisors can moderate or, depending on the 
circumstances, strengthen lending in different phases of the credit cycle.  
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International financial institutions are required to hold a countercyclical buffer that reflects 
the composition of all the countercyclical capital buffers in force in each country of operation 
to which the group has credit exposures. In those ca s, the host country authority imposes the 
buffer for the international exposures, whereas the home country authority can impose a 
higher buffer, but not a lower one (jurisdictional reciprocity principle).66 While this 
requirement has the good intention of levelling the playing field, it creates adverse incentives, 
as institutions have an incentive to transfer activities to countries with no or smaller capital 
buffer requirements.  





Furthermore, Basel III requires better risk coverag, notably with regard to capital market 
activities. An important development constitutes the strengthening of capital requirements and 
risk management in case of counterparty credit exposures stemming from derivatives, repo 
and securities.68 Thus, banks are required to have additional capital to cover possible risks 
stemming from the deterioration of the credit quality of the counterparty. With respect to 
derivatives in particular, the objective is to incetivize banks to move over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivative contracts to central counterparties (CCPs). Importantly, Basel III foresees the 
establishment of an internationally harmonized leverag  ratio to constrain excessive risk-
taking and to serve as a backstop to the risk-based capital requirement. The ratio will include 
both on- and off-balance sheet exposures and derivatives and will be tested at 3% from 2013 
to 2017. 
In addition, the new regulatory framework for banks introduces minimum global liquidity 
standards.69 Two standards are central in this respect: first, the short-term liquidity coverage 
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ratio (LCR), which aims at promoting short-term (i.e. thirty days) resilience of the liquidity 
risk profile of a given bank. The LCR presupposes an acute stress scenario during which the 
bank will need to offset significant net cash outflows (eg loss of deposits or unsecured 
wholesale funding). A transitional period ensures that the LCR will not be introduced until 
2015. Second, the long-term (i.e. one year) standard, which is called the structural net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR), is expected to give incentives to banks to look for more stable sources 
of funding rather than rely too heavily on short-tem wholesale funding. The NSFR is to be 
introduced by 2018.70 
The new framework aims to address the lack of sound liquidity risk management during the 
crisis that has proven to be a major shortcoming of the global financial system. Indeed, Basel 
III requires that individual banks maintain higher and better-quality liquid assets and manage 
their liquidity risk more effectively. Nevertheless, this focus on individual banks appears to 
disregard systemic liquidity risk concerns.71 Thus, the Basel III liquidity rules fail to deal with 
the risk that arises from the possibility of simultaneous breakdowns in the form of contagion 
due to the interconnectedness of various institutions n financial markets.  
Moreover, the BCBS and the Financial Stability Board greed on stricter loss absorbency 
rules for global systemically important banks. According to the relevant consultative 
document published by the BCBS, indicators that can be helpful in the identification of such 
institutions relate to the size of the banks; their interconnectedness; the lack of 
substitutability; their cross-jurisdictional activiy; and their complexity.72 For such banks, 
larger capital buffers – including common equity and ‘early trigger’ contingent capital – or 
minimum requirements for ‘bail-in-able’ debt or a combination of similar measures are on the 
table. This initiative aims at reducing the moral hzard of such institutions while limiting the 
probability of their failure.73 Taking advantage of regulatory differences among jurisdictions, 
large global banks have tended to maintain lower capital base and liquidity ratios. The higher 
loss absorbency requirements are to be introduced together with the capital conservation and 
countercyclical buffers foreseen by Basel III, that is, between 1 January 2016 and December 
2018, becoming fully effective on 1 January 2019.  
Moreover, Basel III makes proposals for more solid risk management, covering areas such as 
corporate governance, off-balance sheet exposures and securitization activities or 
compensation practices. It also calls for better supervision – for instance, when the assessment 
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of the adequacy of a bank’s liquidity risk management framework and its level of liquidity is 
at stake – and effective cooperation not only among supervisors, but also central banks. 
Crucially, the BCBS also put forward good practice principles on supervisory colleges,74 
alluding to the need for coherent cross-border supervision of international banking institutions 
with a view to also improving financial stability at the macroprudential level.75 In this respect, 
effective cross-border crisis management and the ord rly cross-border resolution of cross-
border banks are among the most critical areas on which work is currently being done.76 The 
BCBS follows a principles-based approach in its guidance on creating supervisory colleges, 
putting an accent on the importance of consolidated supervision, whereby home and host 
supervisors exchange information that allows for a more effective overall supervisory 
assessment of a given cross-border financial institution.77 This assessment is ultimately to be 
organized and made by the home supervisor, who remains the main authority in charge of 
ensuring the smooth functioning of its supervisee.  
Indeed, insufficient international co-operation and i formation exchange appear to have had 
deleterious effects in the case of cross-border financial institutions, as shown by the cases of 
Lehman Brothers and the Landsbanki of Iceland.78 The need for supranational supervisors 
with increased powers has come under the spotlight.79 Conceptually, single supervisors may 
prevent ‘competition in laxity’.80 On the other hand, powerful supervisors increase the 
likelihood of regulatory capture and retard financial innovation.81 The level of integration 
again plays a decisive role. For instance, following the de Larosière Report, the EU financial 
supervision legislative package establishes several supranational bodies,82 both at the macro-
prudential level, through the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and at 
the micro-prudential level, through the creation of a European System of Financial 
Supervisors (ESFS), which will be a network of national supervisors. This network is to 
collaborate closely with the new European Supervisoy Authorities (ESAs), the European 
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Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA), and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).83 With various 
operational supervisory powers attributed to the new supranational authorities, supervision 
can no longer be regarded as the Cinderella of financial regulation in Europe,84 whereas the 
balance of powers among national and supranational supervisors is affected to the detriment 
of the former.85 A clear shift towards ‘more Europe’ and a federalization of supervision 
within the EU is thereby to be witnessed.86 
To sum up, regulators internationally have agreed nw capital and liquidity standards for 
banks which aim at increasing the resilience of the financial system. These address the 
excessive leverage and over-reliance on short-term funding that lay behind the financial crisis. 
But the shift to a more crisis-proof banking system will take time. This is also made clear 
from the extended transitional periods that have ben agreed on for implementing the new 
Basel III standards. On 1 January 2019, the new framework should be fully operational, but 
implementation should come about gradually, starting in 2013. Nevertheless, the danger of 
financial fragility will remain large if the regulatory focus does not expand to cover, with the 
same rigour, the institutions of the 'shadow banking system’ that played a central role in the 
recent financial upheaval. 
II.  Reforming Prudential Regulation in the EU and the US  
In the EU, the effects of the financial crisis were very harsh, with crisis-related losses incurred 
by European credit institutions amounting to about €1 trillion or 8% of the EU GDP in the 
period 2007–2010. Based on the de Larosière Report, significant institutional changes have 
occurred in the aftermath of the crisis. As mentioned above, substantive powers were 
transferred to three new ESAs covering banking, insurance, occupational pensions and 
securities. The EBA,87 the ESMA,88 and the EIOPA89 will work together with supervisors 
from Member States to better address problems and coordinate rapid responses to possible 
risks. The ESAs are in charge of adopting rules for d mestic authorities and financial 
institutions; to take urgent action (eg to ban financi l products); to settle disputes among 
domestic supervisors; and to ensure the coherent applic tion of EU law. The strengthening of 
the EU component in this matrix should be regarded as fostering harmonised rules and their 
strict and coherent enforcement. One of the essential missions of the ESAs is to advise the 
Commission on the implementation of legislation ando  drafting technical standards in those 
areas that the new or revised Directives envisage. An interesting feature of the new EU 
financial architecture also relates as to the future interaction between the ESAs and the 
Commission, particularly in cases where they are requi d to act in tandem. In view of the 
case-law of the CJEU,90 the relationship between the Commission and the ESAs may not be 
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one between equals.    
With respect to the macro-prudential level, the new ESRB monitors and assesses potential 
threats to financial stability, focusing notably on providing early warning signals of the build-
up of system-wide risks.91 At the same time the ESFS will assemble financial supervisors 
active at the national level and at the EU level.92 At the level of the EU, the network consists 
of the ESRB and the three micro-supervisory ESAs.  
In tandem with the work undertaken under the auspice  of the BCBS and the aforementioned 
Basel III framework, the EU Commission has proposed the revision of several important 
directives such as the Capital Requirements Directiv  (CRD), the Financial Conglomerate 
Directive and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).93 In the insurance 
sector, the Solvency II Directive which enters into force in 2013 also envisages new rules 
regarding capital.94 
In July 2011, the EU unveiled its CRD IV package.95 In line with Basel III, the Commission’s 
proposals require banks to hold more and better capital that can be used in periods of distress. 
The proposal consists of a Directive relating to the access to deposit-taking activities and a 
Regulation governing the activities of credit institutions and investment firms. Thus, 
prudential requirements relating to the functioning of banking and financial services markets 
and which are meant to ensure the financial stabiliy of the operators on those markets and to 
protect investors and depositors are essentially dealt with in the Regulation, whereas issues 
relating to authorization and ongoing supervision are t ckled in the Directive.96 It follows that 
the bulk of the Basel III reforms are dealt with inthe proposal for a Regulation. 
Institutionally, this is an interesting development, as the proposed CRD IV will replace two 
Directives, that is, Directives 2006/4897 and 2006/49.98 Regulation as a legislative act is a 
powerful instrument leading to the consistent application of a set of rules across the EU, 
which become directly applicable. The proposal thereby aspires to combat the current 
divergence. It remains to be seen how this development entailing maximum harmonization 
will be perceived by the political organs in a policy area where minimum harmonization and 
mutual recognition has been the preferred policy par excellence.99 In addition, the EU aspires 
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to apply the new rules to all banks active in the EU, that is, more than 8,000 banks. 
The proposal for a Directive puts forward in particular provisions relating to sanctions,100 
effective corporate governance101 and provisions discouraging over-reliance on external credit 
ratings.102 It also regulates the issue of initial capital and the increase of capital buffers 
consistent with Basel III, as well as issues relating to cooperation of home and host-state 
supervisors, information exchange and issues of jurisdiction relating to sanctioning. Capital 
buffers such as the capital conservation buffer (identical for all banks in the EU) and the 
countercyclical capital buffer (to be determined at the national level) are introduced in the 
proposal in accordance with the relevant Basel III rules described earlier. Notably for the 
countercyclical buffer rate, national authorities are required to work closely with and follow 
recommendations made by the ESRB. To comply with the new capital requirements and the 
conservation buffer the banks in the EU have to raise new own funds of €84 billion by 2015 
and €460 billion by 2019.103  
Additionally, the proposed Directive attempts to set precise rules relating to the cooperation 
among national supervisors notably with respect to information on liquidity, solvency or large 
exposures. The home country is also required to inform immediately about any liquidity stress 
that institutions active in those jurisdictions may be facing. In the case of multi-country 
institutions, a so-called ‘consolidated supervisor’, typically the home-country authority that 
authorized the creation of that institution, is required to take the lead in the supervision of the 
activities of such institutions across the EU.104 On the other hand, host state supervisors are 
allowed to take precautionary measures in emergency situations. Such measures, nevertheless, 
can be reviewed by EBA and outlawed by the Commission.105 Crucially, the Directive 
reserves a role of mediator to the EBA when disagreement among supervisors persists. More 
generally, the EBA is vested with significant powers to develop rules and guidelines, also in 
accordance with Regulation 1093/2010.106 
The proposed Regulation of the CRD IV package, in tur , constitutes the essential text setting 
out the new prudential requirements for banks and investment firms. In accordance with Basel 
III, the Regulation establishes new requirements relating to capital, liquidity, leverage ratio, 
and counterparty risk. In addition, it imposes signif cant disclosure requirements with regard 
to securitization, notably vis-à-vis the investors, with a view to making public accurate and 
comprehensive information relating to the risk profile of a given institution.107 Disclosure 
requirements are also set out for corporate governance arrangements and remuneration 
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packages. Institutionally speaking, it would be interesting to see how the political organs of 
the EU, yet to be involved in the process of adopting the Regulation, will react to the 
provision giving the Commission the power to impose stricter prudential requirements for a 
limited period, for all exposures or for exposures to one or more sectors, regions or Member 
States.108 
With respect to capital, the proposal underlines the negative effects of the lack of a 
harmonized definition of regulatory capital and thedifferent approaches to the elements of 
capital that should be excluded from own funds. Combined with the ambiguity of regulatory 
ratios which did not allow markets to accurately asses  the solvency of EU institutions, 
financial fragility in the EU was inevitable. The pro osal for a Regulation essentially 
harmonizes the adjustments made to accounting equity in order to determine the amount of 
capital which is prudent to recognize for regulatory purposes. For instance, banks are required 
to deduct from their own funds significant investment in unconsolidated insurance companies, 
thereby ensuring that financial conglomerates do not count in their own funds the capital used 
by an insurance subsidiary. The new adjustments would be gradually introduced to meet the 
target date of the Basel III framework, that is, by 2018.  
With regard to liquidity, the proposal adopts the LCR (to be introduced after an observation 
and review period in 2015) and NSFR (to be introduce  after an observation and review 
period in 2018). Another issue that may prove to be contentious when the proposal is 
discussed within the EU political organs is the provisi n of the proposal giving the power to 
the Commission to further spell out the liquidity coverage requirement consistent with the 
results of the observation period and international developments. For institutions active in 
more than one EU Member State, each national competent authority shall have the last say as 
to the adequacy of the group’s liquidity management and the adequacy of the liquidity of the 
individual credit institutions or investment firms. In such cases, all national competent 
authorities have to agree that the group’s liquidity level is sufficient. More generally, there is 
concern that the liquidity standards are introduced way too late taking into account the 
fragility of the financial system in this period oftime. More importantly, one of the problems 
identified in the proposed reforms is that Eurozone sovereign debt is regarded as a safe liquid 
asset, which is contradicted by the reality and the current sovereign debt crisis hitting the 
Eurozone.109  
Furthermore, the proposal strengthens the requirements for management and capitalization of 
the counterparty credit risk. An additional capital charge will be imposed to cover possible 
losses associated with deterioration in the creditworthiness of the counterparty. The proposal 
also increases the incentive for the big banks to clear OTC instruments through CCPs.110 In 
addition, the proposal introduces a non-risk based leverage ratio, consistent with the Basel III 
rules, with a view to applying it in a binding manner in 2018. 
Along with CRD IV, financial reform of a prudential nature in the EU covers other 
controversial areas as well. For instance, the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation on OTC 
derivatives, CCPs and trade repositories is in the process of being adopted.111 This proposal 
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introduces a reporting obligation for OTC trading;112 a clearing obligation for certain 
categories of OTC derivatives, measures to reduce counterparty credit and operational risk for 
bilaterally cleared OTC derivatives; common rules for CCPs and trade repositories; and rules 
on the establishment of interoperability between CCPs.  
More specifically, detailed information on OTC derivative trades entered into by both EU 
financial firms (such as banks, insurance companies, and funds) and non-financial firms (eg 
energy companies, airlines, and manufacturers) with s gnificant positions in the OTC 
derivatives market is to be reported113 to trade repositories and made accessible to supervisory 
authorities. In addition, trade repositories have to publish aggregate positions by class of 
derivatives, which shall be accessible to all market participants. In view of the systemic 
importance of CCPs, the proposal provides that CCPs have to comply with stringent capital 
requirements, organizational and conduct of busines standards (for instance, disclosure of 
prices). CCP clearing for contracts that have been sta dardized becomes mandatory, while 
risk mitigation standards such as exchange of collateral are foreseen for contracts not cleared 
by a CCP. To reduce operational risk, the use of electronic means for the timely confirmation 
of the terms of OTC derivatives contracts is warranted to allow counterparties to net the 
confirmed transaction against other transactions and ensure the accuracy of book keeping. 114 
Within this framework, the ESMA plays a crucial role, especially regarding the identification 
of contracts subject to the clearing obligation and the surveillance of trade repositories. The 
EU Commission is also in the process of revising several Directives that will affect OTC 
derivatives such as the MiFID (to ensure trading of standardized contracts at organized 
trading venues, enhancing trade and pricing transparency across venue and OTC markets) 115 
and the Market Abuse Directive (extending its scope to OTC derivatives).116 By way of 
comparison, work relating to derivatives within theBCBS has yet to start. 
                                                                                                                                              
European Parliament adopted the new rules on OTC derivatives in March 2012. See Euractiv, ‘MEPs back 
sweeping derivatives regulations’, 30 March 2012, avail ble at: http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/meps-
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The US implemented the Basel II framework domestically for the largest US banks 
(approximately 20) and their holding companies in 2011, but has also pledged to implement 
the Basel III framework once it is finalized.117 The adoption of the Dodd–Frank Act brought 
striking changes to the US financial system. This legislation affects several stakeholders and 
instruments in the financial system, such as commercial banks, investment banks, thrift 
institutions, hedge and private funds, OTC derivatives, and credit rating agencies. In addition, 
the Collins Amendment establishes changes reflecting several Basel III rules. Importantly, the 
Collins Amendment also requires that the relevant federal supervisors develop minimum 
leverage and risk-based capital requirements for all insured depository institutions, depository 
institution holding companies and systemically important non-bank institutions. 
Institutionally, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) is in charge of risk 
identification and management and shall ensure effective interagency cooperation.118 
Supervision is divided between the Federal Deposit In urance Corporation (FDIC), the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Reserve (Fed). The first two 
authorities shall regulate state banks of all sizes (FDIC) and national banks (OCC) with assets 
below US$ 50 billion, whereas the Fed will regulate banks and thrift holding companies with 
assets of over US$ 50 billion.  
One possible clash between the Dodd–Frank Act and the Basel III rules relates to the use of 
credit ratings for regulatory purposes. While the Dodd–Frank Act reduces reliance on external 
credit ratings for federal agency regulation purposes, Basel III still uses external credit ratings 
for the determination of capital charges for certain ssets and for deciding whether assets can 
be counted towards the LCR. Additionally, the Dodd–Frank Act does not require the smallest 
banks to phase out trust-preferred securities, whereas the Basel III rules do not provide for a 
similar exception. Furthermore, it will be interesting to see to what extent the framework 
relating to the capital requirements for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) 
adopted under the aegis of the BCBS will diverge from the one prepared in the US.119 Section 
165 of the Dodd–Frank Act requires the Fed to impose stricter prudential standards, including 
capital requirements, on bank holding companies with consolidated assets of over US$ 50 
billion that pose risks for financial stability in the US. 
The Dodd–Frank Act also covers regulatory reform for OTC derivatives. The authorities in 
charge are the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The former 
shall exercise oversight over security-based swaps, while the latter is to supervise swaps in 
general. Clearing houses or swap repositories shallpublish the collected data with a view to 
enhancing transparency and providing regulators with the tools for monitoring and responding 
to risks. According to the Act, for those swaps that are not cleared through a regulated 
clearing house under the Commodity Exchange Act as a Derivatives Clearing Organization, 
the Dodd–Frank Act requires that rules be adopted to establish initial margin, variation 
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margin and capital requirements for swap dealers, security-based swap dealers, major swap 
participants and major security-based swap participants. The CFTC, the Fed and other US 
prudential regulators proposed such rules in April 2011.120 
E. Financial Innovation, Prudential Regulation and the GATS Prudential Carve-
out  
The GATS is the first multilateral, legally enforceable agreement dealing with trade and 
investment in services and a fortiori financial services. The GATS brings the largest servic  
sector under the multilateral trade umbrella. In view of the interest that the US financial 
industry had in the creation of global rules for regulating financial services trade,121 it comes 
as no surprise that, after intensive bargaining during and after the Uruguay Round, the WTO 
Members agreed on the adoption of the Financial Services Annex and the Fifth Protocol, 
which resulted in the full integration of financial services into the GATS. 122 
The substantially improved Schedules of Commitments agreed upon in December 1997 were 
incorporated into the GATS through the Fifth Protocl, which entered into force in March 
1999. For WTO Members that participated in the 1997 negotiations, but accepted the Fifth 
Protocol after March 1999, commitments entered into force upon acceptance.123 By the 
conclusion of the negotiations, more than 100 WTO Members had undertaken binding 
commitments in the financial sector. All developed countries undertook commitments in all 
sub-sectors of financial services, whereas developing economies opted to schedule 
commitments relating to insurance and banking servic s rather than to capital market-related 
services. Several, mainly OECD, countries, undertook commitments based on the 
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. This is another illustration of the 
GATS’ variable geometry. 
This means that, according to their method of scheduling commitments in the financial sector, 
WTO Members can be divided into two groups: first, those countries that made specific 
commitments consistent with Part III of the GATS; and, second, the countries that voluntarily 
scheduled bolder liberalization obligations in accordance with the Understanding. However, 
based on the most-favoured nation (MFN) principle, those countries that did not use the 
scheduling method of the Understanding would still benefit from the greater financial services 
liberalization that the limited number of Members adopting the Understanding agreed on.  
As one can infer from the analysis above on the Basel III rules, prudential requirements are 
for the most part origin-neutral. Similar to domestic regulation measures under Article VI of 
the GATS, the prudential measures are not regarded as limitations on market access or 
national treatment. Therefore, they are typically not i scribed in the Members’ Schedules.124 
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Nevertheless, prudential regulations may create barriers to trade in financial services in two 
cases: one is when regulatory authorities impose prudential requirements upon foreign 
financial service suppliers which are additional to those imposed upon domestic suppliers; 
and the other is when regulatory authorities impose prudential requirements upon financial 
service suppliers which are different from those imposed by another jurisdiction in which the 
same suppliers are active. Taking into account the previous discussion on the Basel III rules, 
it follows that the further we move towards convergence of prudential standards based on the 
guidelines of the BCBS, the less likely any dispute ov r the WTO consistency of a given 
prudential measure will become. However, a third source of dispute can still be identified – 
when countries decide to impose the same stringent prudential requirements on institutions 
that may not pose similar risks to financial stability.125  
In light of the peculiar nature of prudential regulations, the GATS recognizes in principle the 
right of Members to adopt these non-discriminatory measures to protect, inter alia, financial 
stability. In this respect, paragraph 2(a) of the Financial Services Annex provides: 126  
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Agreement [i.e. the GATS], a Member 
shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the 
protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty 
is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the 
financial system. Where such measures do not conform with the provisions of the 
Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member's commitments 
or obligations under the Agreement.  
In light of the illustrative nature of the list of bjectives, it becomes clear that the permissible 
scope of prudential reasons that can be invoked is fairly wide and can easily accommodate the 
new generation of prudential regulations post-crisis such as those put forward by the BCBS in 
Basel III.127 The GATS seems to allow for broad discretion on the part of the authorities to 
adopt measures to protect the safety and soundness of the financial system, the integrity of 
financial markets, and the financial interests of investors and consumers, provided that they 
are applied even-handedly. Nevertheless, the second se tence of paragraph 2(a) clarifies that 
this provision may not be used as an escape route t circumvent GATS obligations or nullify 
commitments undertaken in the Schedule of a given Mmber, where the impugned measures 
do not conform with the GATS provisions. This langua e differs from that used in Article 
XIV GATS on General Exceptions in that it does not require that the measures be n cessary 
to achieve the stated objectives. It would, therefore, seem that Members have considerable 
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freedom in their choice of prudential measures.128 
Disagreements over the prudential nature of a given measure and its coverage by the 
prudential carve-out are to be solved in accordance with WTO dispute settlement 
procedures.129 The fact that – unlike other public policy exceptions such as national security – 
all prudential measures are considered necessary, does not resolve the issue of whether a 
measure is prudential or is being used to avoid the obligations of the Agreement.130 If the 
latter is established, then a prudential measure could still be outlawed. Crucially, however, the 
structure and wording of paragraph 2 seem to call for judicial restraint. 
Creating a regulatory framework that does not interfer  with – and ideally encourages – 
financial innovation has been one of the recurring concerns of the financial industry, 
particularly in the US. In this respect, one of theinteresting features of the Understanding is 
the provision relating to the use of new financial services. WTO Members that adopted the 
Understanding must allow financial service suppliers of any other Member established in their 
territory to offer in their territory any new financial service.131 Paragraph D.3 of the 
Understanding further specifies that ‘a new financil service is a service of a financial nature, 
including services related to existing and new products or the manner in which a product is 
delivered, that is not supplied by any financial service supplier in the territory of a particular 
Member but which is supplied in the territory of another Member’.  
This provision has three interesting elements: first, it only functions to the benefit of 
established financial service suppliers in the host-c untry market. Second, it may relate to the 
introduction of a given new financial product such as stock-market index funds, futures and 
forwards, swaps or securitization, but it can also relate to a process such as new means of 
processing and pricing transactions. However, one should be able to distinguish between 
product or process innovations, on the one hand, an innovations in the supply of the service 
at stake, on the other hand. The latter do not affect the nature of the service itself and thus 
cannot benefit from the provision relating to new financial services. Third, the introduction of 
the product or the process to the home market (obviously, upon approval by the home-country 
supervisor) becomes a precondition for the acceptance of the product in the host-country 
market, thereby creating a type of equivalence standard, at least with respect to the scrutiny by 
the home-country authority of the risks associated with that product. In fact, there is no 
requirement for the introduction of the new financial service in the home market, but rather it 
appears that the introduction of the new service in the market of any WTO Member would 
suffice. If this is true, then the equivalence standard appears to be relevant for all WTO 
Members. This is a fairly liberal approach, which seems to be contravened by current 
developments even within the BCBS whereby the host-c untry regulator regains several 
powers with regard to foreign financial products and i stitutions. Nevertheless, just as with 
any other obligation in the Understanding, the obligation relating to the acceptance of new 
financial services is subject to the GATS prudential carve-out. 
                                                
128 cf A. von Bogdandy and J. Windsor, ‘Annex on Financi l Services’ in R. Wolfrum; P.-T. Stoll; and C. 
Feinäugle (eds), Max-Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, Volume 6: Trade in Services (Brill, 2008), p. 
618, at 635.  
129 S. Key, The Doha Round and Financial Services Negotiations, The AEI Press, 2003, p. 12. 
130 P. Sorsa, ‘The GATS agreement on financial services – A modest start to multilateral liberalisation’, IMF 
Working Paper, WP/97/55, May 1997, p. 11. 






Financial innovation has altered the risk profile of financial institutions and substantially 
contributed to the increase of interconnectedness among financial as well as among non-
financial institutions. In the aftermath of the crisis, prudential regulations are being revised 
and being made more stringent with a view to increasing resilience in the financial sector. The 
design of the regulatory framework for financial services is important due to the speculative 
nature and complexity of the financial system which, in turn, accentuates the significance of 
trust-building and the protection of reputation in this sector.132 Striking the appropriate 
balance between the two ostensibly conflicting objectiv s of avoiding overregulation and 
ensuring the robustness of institutions, the continuity of markets, the lust for innovation and 
the competitiveness of the financial system is again in the limelight. This exercise seems 
never to have been more daunting than it is now.  
Higher capital requirements will certainly affect the capacity of financial institutions to 
finance the real economy. However, there is empirical evidence suggesting that more 
stringent regulatory intervention in financial markets (for instance, higher capital adequacy 
ratios) in the aftermath of economic shocks did not have an impact on the ability of the 
financial sector to serve its intermediation role in the wake of economic downturns.133 In 
addition, small banks, which usually have a large cli ntele base in SMEs, already maintain a 
strong capital base both in terms of quantity and quality. Large banks, which are by definition 
systemically more important than small banks, seem to have applied stringent capital 
requirements more loosely. Large banks typically operated with lower regulatory capital 
ratios than the other banks.134 This was also the result of the false assumption based on the 
Basel II framework that large institutions would better-equipped to manage risks.135 A 
study conducted by Barclays Capital of November 2010 found that the 35 largest US banks 
fail to meet the common equity requirements of Basel III by between US$ 100 billion and 
US$ 150 billion. According to the Barclays study, 90% of this gap is concentrated in the six 
largest banks.136 Worldwide, 91 of the world’s biggest banks have a capital shortfall of €577 
billion (about US$820 billion).137 This means that assumptions that higher capital 
requirements will force small banks out of the market should not be expressed so lightly. In 
view of these considerations and taking into account that small firms are actually responsible 
for the most financial innovation,138 higher capital requirements alone may not have 
detrimental effects on financial innovation. Rather, higher capital requirements will serve 
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their role, that is, essentially allowing harnessing large institutions that have benefited from 
moral hazard to the detriment of smaller financial institutions and the economy at large. 
Nevertheless, the new liquidity requirements may prove more difficult for medium sized and 
smaller banks to cope with than for larger banks, and this may cause the smaller banks to exit 
lines of business that tie up liquid assets.139 Again, this should not be taken to mean that larger 
banks are better-positioned. According to BCBS, the world’s biggest banks have a combined 
gap of over €1,730 billion in liquid investment that they must fill within four years. 
In this respect, a recurring theme in financial regulation is how to identify the optimal level of 
capital requirements. In the past, capital requirements have proven to be too low, at least for 
some institutions active in the shadow banking system. The danger now is that capital 
requirements are set at a level that is unduly high. More generally, it appears that setting the 
optimum level of capital adequacy for financial inst tutions ex ante is not a walkover. Be this 
as it may, and in view of the past and new developments, it is important to adopt a dynamic 
approach with respect to capital requirements, with supervisory institutions and regulators 
which can at any moment check the appropriateness of capital requirements and if necessary 
adjust these requirements to reflect changes in the financial environment and reduce 
procyclicality. As an easy task as it may sound this in theory, fundamental institutional 
change necessitates in practice a major paradigm shift in institutional creation and functioning 
of supervisory authorities as well as their innate cognitive foundations.140 
This is also associated with the demand for a functio al, open-minded approach to prudential 
regulation, targeting mainly the institutions, be they financial or non-financial, which may 
undermine financial stability. A functional approach to financial supervision would require 
that supervisors focus on the type of business undertaken and pay no particular attention to 
the institutional structure. The Dutch central bank, for instance, is in charge of prudential 
supervision in the pursuit of financial stability, whereas the Authority for Financial Markets is 
tasked with the conduct of business supervision. Both authorities cover the full range of 
financial markets (banking, securities, insurance and pensions).141 In the UK, the UK FSA is 
replaced by a ‘twin peaks’ institutional model, whereby prudential supervision is entrusted to 
the Bank of England, whereas issues relating to conduct of business and consumer protection 
are to dealt with by the new Consumer Protection and Markets Authority.142  
Integrated supervision may discourage innovation. Multiple regulators, notably when staffed 
with high-end experts of the niche financial market at issue, may lead to financial instruments 
being approved more easily and dubious financial innovations being more handily identified 
at an early stage. On the other hand, an integrated regulator would typically require that an 
innovative instrument is approved by successive screns, with all this delays that such screens 
may entail.143 A more nuanced approach is needed which would not make the approval of 
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innovative financial products unduly burdensome. For this, new, more sophisticated and 
dynamic methods for measuring risk appear to be requir d. 
Finally, it is worth noting that financial innovation has remained somewhat neglected in the 
recent attempts at regulatory reform mainly because financial innovation, in the past decade at 
least, has served regulatory arbitrage and tax evasion. Ethical values should also have a role to 
play in the new landscape. This not only concerns fi ancial innovation, but it touches upon 
the very essence of the mechanics of financial markets. The crisis was not the result of non-
compliance with certain rules but rather the result of taking advantages of gaps, ambiguities 
or inefficiencies and omissions in the regulatory framework applied at the time. Thus, the 
crisis occurred ‘not because of non-compliance, but in spite of compliance’.144 Observations 
of this type should guide regulatory intervention in the future towards harnessing rather than 
stifling financial innovation. 
Interestingly, after the decision of various large non-banking institutions and investment 
banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to become bank holding companies,145 any 
new prudential rules will be decisive for the avoidance (or not) of any collapse of individual 
institutions or the entire financial system. A key justification of this assessment is that such 
institutions are the preachers of universal banking, which is admittedly to blame for the 
financial crisis of 2007–9.146 Thus, the fact that the rules will be applying to increasingly 
complex institutions dealing with various financial activities, which may barely be regarded 
as traditional banking activities, gives a different, more important weight to the new 
prudential rules applying to such institutions. To tighten the undertaking of previously 
unrestrained activities to some extent, ring-fencing between banking and non-banking 
activities has become part of the financial regulatory reform in various parts of the world. In 
the US, the new Volcker rule imposes ‘ring-fencing’ that aims at prohibiting the involvement 
of banks in proprietary trading, while limiting their investment in activities relating to hedge 
funds, private equity and derivatives.147 
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